Such places, by their vast importance to the well-being and prosperity of a nation--by the large populations and immense amount of wealth concentrated in them, and by their exposure to maritime attack, offer themselves at once as points at which the most decisive results may be produced.

Cronstadt, Sebastopol, Sweaborg, Kinburn, Odessa, Kertch, Petropauloski, and other places of less note, were in succession or simultaneously objects of attack; while such as the first named became, indeed, the true seats of war." "Around Sebastopol assailed and assailant gathered their resources, and on the result of the arduous struggle may be said to have turned the issue of the war.

Had it not been so decided _there_, Cronstadt would have been the next field of combat,--for which, indeed, the allies had made the most enormous preparations." "Is it not _certain_ that in future all war of maritime powers against the United States, will take a similar course?
All territorial invasion being out of the question, it is against our _great_ seaports and strategic points of coast defence--such as New York, New Orleans, and San Francisco--pre-eminently New York,--that an enemy will concentrate his efforts.

Against these he will prepare such immense armaments, -- against these he will call into existence special agencies of attack, which (unless met by an inexpugnable defensive system) shall _insure_ success." "The mere defense of the city against _ordinary fleets_, is no longer the question; but _through the defensive works to be here erected, the nation is to measure its strength against the most lavish use of the resources of a great maritime power, aided by all that modern science and mechanical ingenuity in creating or inventing means of attack, can bring against them_; in short, in fortifying New York, _we are really preparing the battle-field on which the issue of future momentous contests is to be decided_." A few, however, object to the system at present adopted, on the ground that casemated works do not offer sufficient resistance to ships and floating-batteries, and that earthen works, covering a greater area, will accomplish that object much more effectually, while their longer land fronts will be more difficult of reduction by siege.
It cannot be doubted that earthen batteries, with guns in barbette, can, as a general rule, be more easily taken by assault, that they are more exposed to vertical and ricochet firing, and more expose their gunners to be picked off by sharpshooters.

Moreover, they give but a very limited fire upon the most desirable point, as the entrance to a harbor.
On the other hand, it has not been proved that masonry-casemated works, when properly constructed and properly armed, will not effectually resist a naval cannonade, whether from ships or floating-batteries.