It should also be noted that while the value and necessity of these works are generally admitted, and while the general outline of the system is almost universally approved, many are of the opinion that the increased facilities for naval attacks, and the immense power of modern maritime expeditions, like that upon Sebastopol, render it necessary to more strongly fortify the great naval and commercial ports of New York and San Francisco--one the _key point_ of the Atlantic, and the other of the Pacific coast.

Perhaps the system adopted by our Boards of Engineers may be open to the objection that they have adopted _too many_ points of defence, without giving sufficient prominence to our great seaports, which are necessarily the strategic points of coast defence.

However this may have been _at the time the system was adopted_, there can be no question that the relative strength of the works designed for the different points of our coast does not correspond to _the present_ relative importance of the places to be defended, and the relative temptations they offer to an enemy capable of organizing the means of maritime attack.

On this subject we quote from the work of Major Barnard:-- "While the means of maritime attack have of late years assumed a magnitude and formidableness not dreamed of when our defensive system was planned, and our country has so increased in population, wealth and military resources, that no enemy can hope to make any impression by an invasion of our territory,--our great maritime places like New York, have, on the other hand, increased in even greater proportion, in every thing that could make them objects of attack." "The works deemed adequate in former years for the defence of New York could not, therefore, in the nature of things, be adequate at the present day." "The recent war of England and France against Russia may illustrate my meaning; for it has taught us what to expect were either of these nations to wage war against the United States." "No invasion of territory, no attempt at territorial conquest was made, or thought of; for it was well foreseen that no decisive results would flow from such means.

The war consisted exclusively in attacks upon maritime places--great seaports--seats of commercial and naval power.