As a military maxim, _secure efficiency, by limiting the privileges of rank; exclude favoritism, by giving the power of selection to boards of competent officers, totally independent of party politics_.

Such a system has been for some time pursued in the medical department of our army; it has produced the most satisfactory results; stupidity, ignorance, and aged inefficiency have been _overslaughed_, and will soon entirely disappear from that corps; they have been replaced by young men of activity, talent, character, intelligence, and great professional skill.

Is it less important to have competent military officers to command where the lives of thousands, the honor of our flag, the safety of the country depend upon their judgment and conduct, than it is to have competent surgeons to attend the sick and the wounded?
[Footnote 50: To show the working of this system of political appointments, we would call attention to a single fact.

On the formation of an additional regiment of dragoons in 1836, _thirty_ of its officers were appointed from civil life, and only _four_ from the graduates of the Military Academy.

Of those appointed to that regiment from civil life, _twenty-two_ have already been dismissed or resigned, (most of the latter to save themselves from being dismissed,) and only _eight_ of the whole _thirty_ political appointments are now left, their places having been mainly supplied by graduates of the Military Academy.
In case of another increase of our military establishment, what course will our government pursue?
Will it again pass by the meritorious young officers of our army,--graduates of the Military Academy,--who have spent ten or twelve of the best years of their life in qualifying themselves for the higher duties of their profession, and place over their heads civilians of less education and inferior character--men totally ignorant of military duties, mere pothouse politicians, and the base hirelings of party,--those who screech the loudest in favor of party measures, and degrade themselves the most in order to serve party ends ?--and by thus devoting the army, like the custom-house and post-office, to political purposes, will it seek to increase that vast patronage of the executive which is already debasing individual morality, and destroying the national character?
Should any administration of the government be so unmindful of the interests and honor of the country as to again pursue such a course, it is to be hoped that the sword of political justice will not long slumber in its scabbard.] We wish to call particular attention to this subject.