This is the starting point in our military system, and the basis of our army organization.

Let us see whether this principle is carried out in practice.
For every thousand men in our present organization[41] we have, For the staff, 2 Administrative, 20[42] Infantry, 513 Cavalry, 150 Artillery, 310 Engineers, 5 ---- 1000 [Footnote 41: These numbers are the real rather than the _nominal_ proportions, many of our officers being called _staff_, who properly belong to one of the other classes.] [Footnote 42: Much of the administrative duty in our army is done by unenlisted men, or by soldiers detached from their companies.

Where such is the case, the ratio of this branch of the service ought to be no higher than is represented above.] We see from this table, that while our artillery is nearly six times as numerous as in ordinary armies, our staff is less by one-half, and our engineers not more than one-half what ought to be their proportion in a war establishment.

To this excess of artillery over infantry and cavalry in our army in time of peace there is no objection, inasmuch as the latter could be more easily expanded in case of war than the artillery.
But for a still stronger reason our staff and engineers should also be proportionally increased, instead of being vastly diminished, as is actually the case.
Experience in the first campaigns of the American Revolution strongly impressed on the mind of Washington the absolute necessity of forming a regular and systematic army organization.

But so difficult was it to obtain properly instructed engineers, that he was obliged to seek his engineer officers in the ranks of foreign adventurers, and to make drafts from the other arms of service, and have them regularly instructed in the duties of engineer troops, and commanded by the officers of this corps.