The third point is, that when those vessels (not only of trade, but of war) sail, and since their risk of enemies is at the departure and return (but most on the return), you are advised to take warning not to let the ships be so overladen that because of that they go ill equipped with seamen, and even worse defended.

In conformity with this we have written to the viceroy of Nueva Espana; and have stated that it would be a less disadvantage to increase the number of ships than to overload those that are sent--to say nothing of the damage done to the hull of the ship by carrying so heavy a cargo.

Also you are advised, on account of what you say in this section--since you say that the Dutch get help in boats, money, ammunition, food, and men in Xapon--that it would be well, since there is so continual communication between Japon and our government [in those islands], that you endeavor--through an embassy, or in any other way--to negotiate with any king of those of Xapon, or with the person who is the cause of that [aid to the Dutch], and tell them that those enemies are pirates, and that they violate the laws of nations and the public peace.

Finally, since you have the matter in hand and know the importance of separating the Japanese and Dutch, you shall do this with such energy and skill as your prudence admits, doing all that you shall deem necessary and useful to attain that end." _In another hand_: "A letter is being written to the viceroy of Nueva Espana, sending him a copy of his [i.e., Fajardo's] clause, and what answer is made to it; and advising him, as here above stated, that an order has been given so that they shall endeavor to have the despatch of the flagship and almiranta of Filipinas attended to promptly and seasonably, as is necessary for their voyage.

Accordingly he shall again issue orders to that effect, and advise us of what is done in this matter."] [21] 2d.