We had discovered how hopeless the German position really was, a discovery which some, though not all, had anticipated, but which no one had dared reckon on as a certainty.

It was evident that we could have secured unconditional surrender if we had determined to get it.
But there was another new factor in the situation which was of greater local importance.

The British Prime Minister had perceived that the conclusion of hostilities might soon bring with it the break-up of the political _bloc_ upon which he was depending for his personal ascendency, and that the domestic difficulties which would be attendant on demobilization, the turn-over of industry from war to peace conditions, the financial situation, and the general psychological reactions of men's minds, would provide his enemies with powerful weapons, if he were to leave them time to mature.

The best chance, therefore, of consolidating his power, which was personal and exercised, as such, independently of party or principle, to an extent unusual in British politics, evidently lay in active hostilities before the prestige of victory had abated, and in an attempt to found on the emotions of the moment a new basis of power which might outlast the inevitable reactions of the near future.

Within a brief period, therefore, after the Armistice, the popular victor, at the height of his influence and his authority, decreed a General Election.