[The Economic Consequences of the Peace by John Maynard Keynes]@TWC D-Link bookThe Economic Consequences of the Peace CHAPTER IV 51/60
Of Poland's pre-war annual demand of 10,500,000 tons, 6,800,000 tons were supplied by the indisputably Polish districts adjacent to Upper Silesia. 1,500,000 tons from Upper Silesia (out of a total Upper Silesian output of 43,500,000 tons), and the balance from what is now Czecho-Slovakia. Even without any supply from Upper Silesia and Czecho-Slovakia, Poland could probably meet her requirements by the fuller exploitation of her own coalfields which are not yet scientifically developed, or from the deposits of Western Galicia which are now to be annexed to her. [42] France is also to receive annually for three years 35,000 tons of benzol, 60,000 tons of coal tar, and 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia. [43] The Reparation Commission is authorized under the Treaty (Part VIII Annex V.para.
10) "to postpone or to cancel deliveries" if they consider "that the full exercise of the foregoing options would interfere unduly with the industrial requirements of Germany." In the event of such postponements or cancellations "the coal to replace coal from destroyed mines shall receive priority over other deliveries." This concluding clause is of the greatest importance, if, as will be seen, it is physically impossible for Germany to furnish the full 45,000,000; for it means that France will receive 20,000,000 tons before Italy receives anything.
The Reparation Commission has no discretion to modify this. The Italian Press has not failed to notice the significance of the provision, and alleges that this clause was inserted during the absence of the Italian representatives from Paris (_Corriere della Sera_, July 19, 1919). [44] It follows that the current rate of production in Germany has sunk to about 60 per cent of that of 1913.
The effect on reserves has naturally been disastrous, and the prospects for the coming winter are dangerous. [45] This assumes a loss of output of 15 per cent as compared with the estimate of 30 per cent quoted above. [46] This supposes a loss of 23 per cent of Germany's industrial undertaking and a diminution of 13 per cent in her other requirements. [47] The reader must he reminded in particular that the above calculations take no account of the German production of lignite, which yielded in 1913 13,000,000 tons of rough lignite in addition to an amount converted into 21,000,000 tons of briquette.
This amount of lignite, however, was required in Germany before the war _in addition to_ the quantities of coal assumed above.
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