Demand as well as supply will be diminished by loss of territory, but at the most extravagant estimate this could not be put above 29,000,000 tons.[46] Our hypothetical calculations, therefore, leave us with post-war German domestic requirements, on the basis of a pre-war efficiency of railways and industry, of 110,000,000 tons against an output rot exceeding 100,000,000 tons, of which 40,000,000 tons are mortgaged to the Allies.
The importance of the subject has led me into a somewhat lengthy statistical analysis.

It is evident that too much significance must not be attached to the precise figures arrived at, which are hypothetical and dubious.[47] But the general character of the facts presents itself irresistibly.

Allowing for the loss of territory and the loss of efficiency, Germany cannot export coal in the near future (and will even be dependent on her Treaty rights to purchase in Upper Silesia), if she is to continue as an industrial nation.

Every million tons she is forced to export must be at the expense of closing down an industry.

With results to be considered later this within certain limits is _possible_.
But it is evident that Germany cannot and will not furnish the Allies with a contribution of 40,000,000 tons annually.