If he was met on some points with apparent generosity (for there was always a safe margin of quite preposterous suggestions which no one took seriously), it was difficult for him not to yield on others.
Compromise was inevitable, and never to compromise on the essential, very difficult.

Besides, he was soon made to appear to be taking the German part and laid himself open to the suggestion (to which he was foolishly and unfortunately sensitive) of being "pro-German." After a display of much principle and dignity in the early days of the Council of Ten, he discovered that there were certain very important points in the program of his French, British, or Italian colleague, as the case might be, of which he was incapable of securing the surrender by the methods of secret diplomacy.

What then was he to do in the last resort?
He could let the Conference drag on an endless length by the exercise of sheer obstinacy.

He could break it up and return to America in a rage with nothing settled.

Or he could attempt an appeal to the world over the heads of the Conference.