At first sight it would seem that a system which gave the services of five hundred ships and their crews to the task of annoying the British, and inflicting damage upon their commerce without cost to the American Government, must be wholly advantageous.

We have already seen the losses inflicted upon British commerce by our privateers reflected in the rapidly increasing cost of marine insurance.

While the statistics in the possession of the Government are not complete, they show that twenty-five hundred vessels at least were captured during the War of 1812 by these privately-owned cruisers, and there can be no shadow of a doubt that the loss inflicted upon British merchants, and the constant state of apprehension for the safety of their vessels in which they were kept, very materially aided in extending among them a willingness to see peace made on almost any terms.
But this is the other side of the story: The prime purpose of the privateer was to make money for its owners, its officers, and its crew.
The whole design and spirit of the calling was mercenary.

It inflicted damage on the enemy, but only incidentally to earning dividends for its participants.

If Government cruisers had captured twenty-five hundred British vessels, those vessels would have been lost to the enemy forever.
But the privateer, seeking gains, tried to send them into port, however dangerous such a voyage might be, and accordingly, rather more than a third of them were recaptured by the enemy.