The affection is undoubtedly positive; but the cause may be, as in this case it certainly is, a sort of _privation_.
And it is very reasonable that we should distinguish by some term two things so distinct in nature, as a pleasure that is such simply, and without any relation, from that pleasure which cannot exist without a relation, and that, too, a relation to pain.

Very extraordinary it would be, if these affections, so distinguishable in their causes, so different in their effects, should be confounded with each other, because vulgar use has ranged them under the same general title.
Whenever I have occasion to speak of this species of relative pleasure, I call it _delight_; and I shall take the best care I can to use that word in no other sense.

I am satisfied the word is not commonly used in this appropriated signification; but I thought it better to take up a word already known, and to limit its signification, than to introduce a new one, which would not perhaps incorporate so well with the language.
I should never have presumed the least alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philosophy, and the nature of my subject, that leads me out of the common track of discourse, did not in a manner necessitate me to it.
I shall make use of this liberty with all possible caution.

As I make use of the word _delight_ to express the sensation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger, so, when I speak of positive pleasure, I shall for the most part call it simply _pleasure_.
SECTION V.
JOY AND GRIEF.
It must be observed, that the cessation of pleasure affects the mind three ways.

If it simply ceases after having continued a proper time, the effect is _indifference_; if it be abruptly broken off, there ensues an uneasy sense called _disappointment_; if the object be so totally lost that there is no chance of enjoying it again, a passion arises in the mind which is called _grief_.