For what purpose, in any cause, shall we hereafter contend with France?
Can we ever flatter ourselves that we shall wage a more successful war?
If, on our part, in a war the most prosperous we ever carried on, by sea and by land, and in every part of the globe, attended with the unparalleled circumstance of an immense increase of trade and augmentation of revenue; if a continued series of disappointments, disgraces, and defeats, followed by public bankruptcy, on the part of France; if all these still leave her a gainer on the whole balance, will it not be downright frenzy in us ever to look her in the face again, or to contend with her any, even the most essential points, since victory and defeat, though by different ways, equally conduct us to our ruin?
Subjection to France without a struggle will indeed be less for our honor, but on every principle of our author it must be more for our advantage.
According to his representation of things, the question is only concerning the most easy fall.

France had not discovered, our statesman tells us, at the end of that war, the triumphs of defeat, and the resources which are derived from bankruptcy.

For my poor part, I do not wonder at their blindness.

But the English ministers saw further.

Our author has at length let foreigners also into the secret, and made them altogether as wise as ourselves.