And as you seem desirous of knowing how it is that, notwithstanding the different opinions of philosophers with regard to the ends of goods, virtue has still sufficient security for the effecting of a happy life--which security, as we are informed, Carneades used indeed to dispute against; but he disputed as against the Stoics, whose opinions he combated with great zeal and vehemence.

I, however, shall handle the question with more temper; for if the Stoics have rightly settled the _ends_ of goods, the affair is at an end; for a wise man must necessarily be always happy.
But let us examine, if we can, the particular opinions of the others, that so this excellent decision, if I may so call it, in favor of a happy life, may be agreeable to the opinions and discipline of all.
XXX.

These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and defended--the first four are simple ones: "that nothing is good but what is honest," according to the Stoics; "nothing good but pleasure," as Epicurus maintains; "nothing good but a freedom from pain," as Hieronymus[62] asserts; "nothing good but an enjoyment of the principal, or all, or the greatest goods of nature," as Carneades maintained against the Stoics--these are simple, the others are mixed propositions.

Then there are three kinds of goods: the greatest being those of the mind; the next best those of the body; the third are external goods, as the Peripatetics call them, and the Old Academics differ very little from them.

Dinomachus[63] and Callipho[64] have coupled pleasure with honesty; but Diodorus[65] the Peripatetic has joined indolence to honesty.