But how can any one be in possession of that desirable and much-coveted security (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a security, on which freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of evils attending him?
How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold everything as trifles which can befall a man?
for so a wise man should do, unless he be one who thinks that everything depends on himself.
Could the Lacedaemonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent all their attempts, have asked him if he could prevent their killing themselves?
Is it not easier, then, to find one man of such a spirit as we are inquiring after, than to meet with a whole city of such men?
Now, if to this courage I am speaking of we add temperance, that it may govern all our feelings and agitations, what can be wanting to complete his happiness who is secured by his courage from uneasiness and fear, and is prevented from immoderate desires and immoderate insolence of joy by temperance?
I could easily show that virtue is able to produce these effects, but that I have explained on the foregoing days.
XV.

But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquillity renders it happy; and as these perturbations are of two sorts, grief and fear, proceeding from imagined evils, and as immoderate joy and lust arise from a mistake about what is good, and as all these feelings are in opposition to reason and counsel; when you see a man at ease, quite free and disengaged from such troublesome commotions, which are so much at variance with one another, can you hesitate to pronounce such a one a happy man?
Now, the wise man is always in such a disposition; therefore the wise man is always happy.
Besides, every good is pleasant; whatever is pleasant may be boasted and talked of; whatever may be boasted of is glorious; but whatever is glorious is certainly laudable, and whatever is laudable doubtless, also, honorable: whatever, then, is good is honorable (but the things which they reckon as goods they themselves do not call honorable); therefore what is honorable alone is good.

Hence it follows that a happy life is comprised in honesty alone.

Such things, then, are not to be called or considered goods, when a man may enjoy an abundance of them, and yet be most miserable.

Is there any doubt but that a man who enjoys the best health, and who has strength and beauty, and his senses flourishing in their utmost quickness and perfection--suppose him likewise, if you please, nimble and active, nay, give him riches, honors, authority, power, glory--now, I say, should this person, who is in possession of all these, be unjust, intemperate, timid, stupid, or an idiot--could you hesitate to call such a one miserable?
What, then, are those goods in the possession of which you may be very miserable?
Let us see if a happy life is not made up of parts of the same nature, as a heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind.