But who can with correctness speak in praise of a mediocrity of evils?
Can any one in whom there is lust or desire be otherwise than libidinous or desirous?
or can a man who is occupied by anger avoid being angry?
or can one who is exposed to any vexation escape being vexed?
or if he is under the influence of fear, must he not be fearful?
Do we look, then, on the libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the timid man, as persons of wisdom, of excellence?
of which I could speak very copiously and diffusely, but I wish to be as concise as possible.
And so I will merely say that wisdom is an acquaintance with all divine and human affairs, and a knowledge of the cause of everything.

Hence it is that it imitates what is divine, and looks upon all human concerns as inferior to virtue.

Did you, then, say that it was your opinion that such a man was as naturally liable to perturbation as the sea is exposed to winds?
What is there that can discompose such gravity and constancy?
Anything sudden or unforeseen?
How can anything of this kind befall one to whom nothing is sudden and unforeseen that can happen to man?
Now, as to their saying that redundancies should be pared off, and only what is natural remain, what, I pray you, can be natural which may be too exuberant?
XXVII.

All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must be entirely plucked up and destroyed, not pared and amputated.

But as I suspect that your inquiry is not so much respecting the wise man as concerning yourself (for you allow that he is free from all perturbations, and you would willingly be so too yourself), let us see what remedies there are which may be applied by philosophy to the diseases of the mind.