[Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations by Marcus Tullius Cicero]@TWC D-Link book
Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations

BOOK III
4/51

I might call them diseases, and that would be a literal translation, but it is not agreeable to our way of speaking.

For envy, delight, and pleasure are all called by the Greeks diseases, being affections of the mind not in subordination to reason; but we, I think, are right in calling the same motions of a disturbed soul perturbations, and in very seldom using the term diseases; though, perhaps, it appears otherwise to you.
_A._ I am of your opinion.
_M._ And do you think a wise man subject to these?
_A._ Entirely, I think.
_M._ Then that boasted wisdom is but of small account, if it differs so little from madness?
_A._ What?
does every commotion of the mind seem to you to be madness?
_M._ Not to me only; but I apprehend, though I have often been surprised at it, that it appeared so to our ancestors many ages before Socrates; from whom is derived all that philosophy which relates to life and morals.
_A._ How so?
_M._ Because the name madness[35] implies a sickness of the mind and disease; that is to say, an unsoundness and an unhealthiness of mind, which they call madness.

But the philosophers call all perturbations of the soul diseases, and their opinion is that no fool is ever free from these; but all that are diseased are unsound; and the minds of all fools are diseased; therefore all fools are mad.

For they held that soundness of the mind depends on a certain tranquillity and steadiness; and a mind which was destitute of these qualities they called insane, because soundness was inconsistent with a perturbed mind just as much as with a disordered body.
V.Nor were they less ingenious in calling the state of the soul devoid of the light of the mind, "a being out of one's mind," "a being beside one's self." From whence we may understand that they who gave these names to things were of the same opinion with Socrates, that all silly people were unsound, which the Stoics have carefully preserved as being derived from him; for whatever mind is distempered (and, as I just now said, the philosophers call all perturbed motions of the mind distempers) is no more sound than a body is when in a fit of sickness.
Hence it is that wisdom is the soundness of the mind, folly a sort of unsoundness, which is insanity, or a being out of one's mind: and these are much better expressed by the Latin words than the Greek, which you will find the case also in many other topics.

But we will discuss that point elsewhere: let us now attend to our present subject.


<<Back  Index  Next>>

D-Link book Top

TWC mobile books