Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who could prove that you had known?
But we are bringing forward too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found.
And on these topics a great deal is said by Laelius in our treatise on the Republic.
If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful.
* * * XXVII.

I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the affection borne to our children is implanted by nature; indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man and man which has its origin in nature.

And if there be not, then there is an end of all society in life.

May it turn out well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever done for the sake of another?
And when they say that a man ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one.

But these arguments are argued, I think, in those books by praising which you have given me spirits.
In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not that of a wise man.
XXVIII.