There is therefore a peculiar nature and power in the soul, distinct from those natures which are more known and familiar to us.

Whatever, then, that is which thinks, and which has understanding, and volition, and a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account must necessarily be eternal; nor can God himself, who is known to us, be conceived to be anything else except a soul free and unembarrassed, distinct from all mortal concretion, acquainted with everything, and giving motion to everything, and itself endued with perpetual motion.
XXVIII.

Of this kind and nature is the intellect of man.

Where, then, is this intellect seated, and of what character is it?
where is your own, and what is its character?
Are you able to tell?
If I have not faculties for knowing all that I could desire to know, will you not even allow me to make use of those which I have?
The soul has not sufficient capacity to comprehend itself; yet, the soul, like the eye, though it has no distinct view of itself, sees other things: it does not see (which is of least consequence) its own shape; perhaps not, though it possibly may; but we will pass that by: but it certainly sees that it has vigor, sagacity, memory, motion, and velocity; these are all great, divine, eternal properties.

What its appearance is, or where it dwells, it is not necessary even to inquire.