Under such a system, the legislature would elect the chief executive, if not the judicial officials; and it would become like the British Parliament exclusively and comprehensively responsible for the work of government--both in its legislative and administrative branches.
The foregoing type of organization has so many theoretical advantages that one would like to see it tried in some American states.

But for the present it is not likely to be tried.

The responsibility of the legislature could not be exercised without the creation of some institution corresponding to the British Cabinet: and the whole tendency of American political development has been away from any approach to the English Parliamentary system.

Whatever the theoretical advantages of legislative omnipotence, it would constitute in this country a dangerous and dubious method of concentrating local governmental responsibility and power.

It might succeed, in case it were accompanied by the adoption of some effective measures for improving the quality of the representation--such, for instance, as the abandonment of all existing traditions necessitating the residence of the representative in the district he represents.