Once more, the tide had been missed: time had been given to inculcate all manner of doubts and suspicions--and once more the suspicions proved to be only too well justified.

The whole story was revealed to the House on July 24th.
Redmond, in his speech, emphasized it that the proposals had come not from the Nationalists, but from the Government; they had, however, been accepted, after considerable negotiation and many changes in substance, as a plan which Nationalists could recommend for acceptance.
Nationalists had been pressed to use the utmost despatch, had been told that every hour counted and that it was essential in the highest Imperial interests, if Ireland endorsed the agreement, that it should be put into operation at once.

"That is two long months ago," he said.
Action had been taken; the unpopularity of the proposals, fully foreseen, had been faced, on a clear understanding.
"The agreement was in the words of the Prime Minister himself, for what he called a provisional settlement which should last until the war was over, or until a final and permanent settlement was arrived at within a limited period after the war.

This was the chief factor of this plan, and without it not one of my colleagues or myself would for a moment have considered it, much less have submitted it to our followers." The retention of Irish members at Westminster in full strength was covenanted for "as an indispensable safeguard of the temporary character of the whole arrangement." It was on this construction of the agreement that consent to it had been secured, in the face of very strong and organized opposition: and consent was secured to it as a final document.

Nevertheless, when Redmond arrived in London he had been at once confronted with a demand for modifications--of which the first were unimportant.