For example, if a man be seated, the supposition of his being seated is necessarily true; and, conversely, if the supposition of his being seated is true, because he is really seated, he must necessarily be sitting.

So, in either case, there is some necessity involved--in this latter case, the necessity of the fact; in the former, of the truth of the statement.

But in both cases the sitter is not therefore seated because the opinion is true, but rather the opinion is true because antecedently he was sitting as a matter of fact.

Thus, though the cause of the truth of the opinion comes from the other side,[P] yet there is a necessity on both sides alike.

We can obviously reason similarly in the case of providence and the future.
Even if future events are foreseen because they are about to happen, and do not come to pass because they are foreseen, still, all the same, there is a necessity, both that they should be foreseen by God as about to come to pass, and that when they are foreseen they should happen, and this is sufficient for the destruction of free will.