[The Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius]@TWC D-Link book
The Consolation of Philosophy

BOOK V
23/37

Whence it follows that when it perceives that something will come into existence, and yet is perfectly aware that this is unbound by any necessity, its apprehension is not opinion, but rather knowledge based on truth.

And if to this thou sayest that what God sees to be about to come to pass cannot fail to come to pass, and that what cannot fail to come to pass happens of necessity, and wilt tie me down to this word necessity, I will acknowledge that thou affirmest a most solid truth, but one which scarcely anyone can approach to who has not made the Divine his special study.

For my answer would be that the same future event is necessary from the standpoint of Divine knowledge, but when considered in its own nature it seems absolutely free and unfettered.
So, then, there are two necessities--one simple, as that men are necessarily mortal; the other conditioned, as that, if you know that someone is walking, he must necessarily be walking.

For that which is known cannot indeed be otherwise than as it is known to be, and yet this fact by no means carries with it that other simple necessity.

For the former necessity is not imposed by the thing's own proper nature, but by the addition of a condition.


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