With a view of making this at last clear and plain, I will begin by considering the arguments by which thou art swayed.

First, I inquire into the reasons why thou art dissatisfied with the solution proposed, which is to the effect that, seeing the fact of foreknowledge is not thought the cause of the necessity of future events, foreknowledge is not to be deemed any hindrance to the freedom of the will.

Now, surely the sole ground on which thou arguest the necessity of the future is that things which are foreknown cannot fail to come to pass.

But if, as thou wert ready to acknowledge just now, the fact of foreknowledge imposes no necessity on things future, what reason is there for supposing the results of voluntary action constrained to a fixed issue?
Suppose, for the sake of argument, and to see what follows, we assume that there is no foreknowledge.

Are willed actions, then, tied down to any necessity in _this_ case ?' 'Certainly not.' 'Let us assume foreknowledge again, but without its involving any actual necessity; the freedom of the will, I imagine, will remain in complete integrity.