In fact, his extreme right rested on the tower-crowned heights of Solferino, where the forces of Austria two generations later maintained so desperate a defence against the onset of Napoleon III.

and his liberating army.
Owing to the non-arrival of Mezaros' corps marching from Legnago, Wuermser mustered scarcely twenty-five thousand men on his long line; while the very opportune approach of part of Serurier's division, under the lead of Fiorella, from the south, gave the French an advantage even in numbers.

Moreover, Fiorella's advance on the south of Wuermser's weaker flank, that near Medole, threatened to turn it and endanger the Austrian communications with Mantua.

The Imperialists seem to have been unaware of this danger; and their bad scouting here as elsewhere was largely responsible for the issue of the day.
Wuermser's desire to stretch a helping hand to Quosdanovich near Lonato and his confidence in the strength of his own right wing betrayed him into a fatal imprudence.

Sending out feelers after his hard-pressed colleague on the north, he dangerously prolonged his line, an error in which he was deftly encouraged by Bonaparte, who held back his own left wing.