Had Bonaparte listened to Augereau's advice and persisted still in besieging Mantua, the scattered French forces must have been crushed in detail.

Augereau's words are those of a mere fighter, not of a strategist; and the timidity which he ungenerously attributed to Bonaparte was nothing but the caution which a superior intellect saw to be a necessary prelude to a victorious move.
That the fighting honours of the ensuing days rightly belong to Augereau may be frankly conceded.

With forces augmented by the northern part of the besiegers of Mantua, he moved rapidly westwards from the Mincio against Brescia, and rescued it from the vanguard of Quosdanovich (August 1st).

On the previous day other Austrian detachments had also, after obstinate conflicts, been worsted near Salo and Lonato.

Still, the position was one of great perplexity: for though Massena's division from the Adige was now beginning to come into touch with Bonaparte's chief force, yet the fronts of Wuermser's columns were menacing the French from that side, while the troops of Quosdanovich, hovering about Lonato and Salo, struggled desperately to stretch a guiding hand to their comrades on the Mincio.
Wuermser was now discovering his error.