But the fault was committed of so far dividing the Austrians that nowhere could they deal a crushing blow.
Quosdanovich with 17,600 men was to take the western side of Lake Garda, seize the French magazines at Brescia, and cut their communications with Milan and France: the main body under Wuermser, 24,300 strong, was meanwhile to march in two columns on either bank of the Adige, drive the French from Rivoli and push on towards Mantua: and yet a third division, led by Davidovich from the district of Friuli on the east, received orders to march on Vicenza and Legnago, in order to distract the French from that side, and possibly relieve Mantua if the other two onsets failed.
Faulty as these dispositions were, they yet seriously disconcerted Bonaparte.

He was at Montechiaro, a village situated on the road between Brescia and Mantua, when, on July 29th, he heard that the white-coats had driven in Massena's vanguard above Rivoli on the Adige, were menacing other positions near Verona and Legnago, and were advancing on Brescia.

As soon as the full extent of the peril was manifest, he sent off ten despatches to his generals, ordering a concentration of troops--these, of course, fighting so as to delay the pursuit--towards the southern end of Lake Garda.

This wise step probably saved his isolated forces from disaster.

It was at that point that the Austrians proposed to unite their two chief columns and crush the French detachments.