Or why not adopt a two-fold policy--of supplying men to the Allies as rapidly as possible, for immediate aid, carrying on preparations the while for an independent American Army with all its own supplies, as the ultimate goal?
Time, it was urged, was of the utmost importance.

And what object was served by experimenting with new types of munitions, instead of adopting the types of the Allies, which the American factories were already turning out in profusion?
And so on.
With such feelings did many of us on this side of the water, and a large section apparently of American friends of the Allies on the other side, watch the gradual unravelling of America's tangled skeins.
The _North American Review_ asked in December, 1917: "Are we losing the war?
No.

But we are not winning it." In January, 1918, the editor warned his readers: "The Allied forces are not in condition to withstand the terrific onslaught which Germany is bound to make within six months.

America must win the war." In April the _New York Bankers' Bulletin_ said: "We have not made progress as far as we might or could," while months later, even in its September number (1918), the _North American Review_ still talked of "our inexplicable military sluggishness," and rang with appeals for greater energy.

There was of course an element of politics in all this; but up to March last year it is clear that, in spite of many things not only magnificently planned, but magnificently _done_, there was a great deal of sincere anxiety and misgiving in both countries.
But with the outbreak of the German offensive in March, as we all know, everything changed.