[Fields of Victory by Mrs. Humphry Ward]@TWC D-Link book
Fields of Victory

CHAPTER IX
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In many cases no defence could be made in time against the tanks, which attacked them from all sides." And the peremptory order follows: "Messages concerning tanks will have priority over all other messages or calls whatsoever." Naturally the German Army and the German public had by this time begun to ask why the German Command was not itself better equipped with tanks before the opening of the Allied offensive.

The answer seems to be, first of all, that they were originally thought little of, as "a British idea." "The use of 300 British tanks at Cambrai," says a German document, "was a 'battle of material.' The German Higher Command decided from the very outset not to fight a 'battle of material.'" They preferred instead their habitual policy of "massed attack"-- using thereby in the fighting line a number of inferior men, "classified as fit for garrison or labour duties," but who, if they "can carry a rifle, must fight." The German Command were, therefore, "not in a position to find the labour for the construction of new and additional material such as tanks." For the initial arrogance, however, which despised the tanks, and for the system which had prevented him from building them in time, when their importance was realised, the enemy was soon plunged in bitter but unavailing regrets.
All he could do was to throw the blame of failure on the Allies' new weapon, and to issue despairing appeals to his own troops.

The Allies were sometimes stated to have captured such and such a place "by the use of masses of tanks," when, as a matter of fact, very few tanks had been used.

And this convenient excuse, as it appeared in the official _communiques_, began soon to have some strange and disastrous results.
The German regimental officer began to think that as soon as tanks appeared, it was _a sufficient reason for the loss of a position_.

For the German Army last year might be divided into three categories: "A small number of stout-hearted men (chiefly machine-gunners), who could be depended on to fight to the last; men who did not intend to fight, and _did_ intend to put up their hands on the first occasion; and, thirdly, the 'great middle class,' who were prepared to do their duty, and had a sense of discipline, but who could not be classed as heroes....


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