He said it would be difficult for me to draw up a written communication which would not have the air of a threat." To this Lyons agreed[525].
This permitted a warmth-creating impression to Englishmen of the "forthright yet friendly" tone of British diplomats when dealing with Seward.

So also did Russell's instruction of August 8, not yet received by Lyons when he took the stage at Washington.

Yet there is a possibility that Lyons was in fact merely playing his part as Seward had asked him to play it.

On the next day, August 13, he acknowledged the receipt of Russell's communication of July 24, in which it was stated that while Great Britain could not acquiesce in the "Southern Ports" Bill _no final instructions_ would be sent until Lincoln issued a Proclamation.

Lyons now explained, "As Mr.Seward is undoubtedly at this moment opposed to closing the Ports, I have thought it wiser to be guided by him for the present as to the mode of communicating your decision about the matter[526]." Is it possible that Seward really wished to have a "strong," yet not "too strong" statement from Lyons in order to combat the advocates of the "Ports" Bill?
There are many ramifications of diplomatic policy--especially in a popular government.
At any rate on August 16 Lyons could assure Russell that there "was no question now of issuing the Proclamation[527]." And on the nineteenth could write officially that a Proclamation based on the Bill had indeed been issued, but without the objectionable fourth section[528].
The whole affair of the "Southern Ports" Bill occupies more space in the British Parliamentary Papers, and excited more attention from the British Government than it would seem to have merited from the Washington attitude toward it.