Now in fact British trade was destined to be badly hurt by the blockade, but as yet had not been greatly hampered.

Nor did Russell yet think an effective blockade feasible.

Writing to Lyons a week after his official protest on the "Southern Ports" Bill, he expressed the opinion that a "_regular_ blockade" could not possibly prevent trade with the South: "If our ships can go in ballast for cotton to the Southern Ports it will be well, but if this cannot be done by agreement there will be surely, in the extent of 3,000 miles, creeks and bays out of which small vessels may come, and run for Jamaica or the Bahamas where the cargoes might be transhipped.

But it is not for Downing Street to suggest such plans to Cheapside and Tooley Street[530]." A better knowledge of American geography would have made clear to Russell that if but seven Southern ports were effectively blockaded the remaining 2,550 miles of coast line would be useless for the export of cotton in any considerable amount.

His bays and creeks did indeed long provide access to small vessels, but these were not adequate for the transport of a bulky export like cotton[531].