Wilkes, whether the United States claimed to be considered as Belligerents, _or as a Government engaged in putting down a rebellion_, was a violation of all those principles of Maritime international law, which France had ever supported[481] ..." and had instructed Mercier to so state to Seward.

This implied a reflection on former British practice, especially as regards the exercise of a right of search to recover its own citizens and is indicative of the correctness of Adams' judgment that one main reason for European support of Great Britain in the _Trent_ crisis, was the general desire to tie her to a limitation of belligerent maritime power.
In notifying Russell of the release of the prisoners, Lyons had stated that he would caution the Commander of the ship conveying them that they were "not to be received with honours or treated otherwise than as distinguished _private_ gentlemen[482]." Russell was equally cautious, seeing Mason, shortly after arrival in London, "unofficially at my own house," on February 10, refusing to read his credentials, and after listening to a statement of his instructions, replying that "nothing had hitherto occurred which would justify or induce" Great Britain to depart from a position of neutrality[483].

Russell had already suggested that Thouvenel use the same method with Slidell[484].

This procedure does not necessarily indicate a change in governmental attitude, for it is exactly in line with that pursued toward the Confederate Commissioners before the _Trent_; but the _Trent_ controversy might naturally have been expected to have brought about an _easier_ relation between Russell and a Southern representative.

That it did not do so is evidence of Russell's care not to give offence to Northern susceptibilities.