The comment of those who were "wise after the event" was that true policy would have dictated an immediate release of the prisoners as seized in violation of international law, before any complaint could be received from Great Britain.

This leaves out of consideration the political difficulties at home of an administration already seriously weakened by a long-continued failure to "press the war," and it also fails to recognize that in the American Cabinet itself a proposal by Seward to release, made immediately, would in all probability have been negatived.

Blair, in the Cabinet, and Sumner in the Senate, were, indeed, in favour of prompt release, but Lincoln seems to have thought the prisoners must be held, even though he feared they might become "white elephants." All that Seward could do at first was to notify Adams that Wilkes had acted without instructions[472].
On Christmas morning the Cabinet met to consider the answer to Great Britain.

Sumner attended and read letters from Bright and Cobden, earnestly urging a yielding by America and depicting the strength of British feeling.

Bright wrote: "If you are resolved to succeed against the South, _have no war with England_; make every concession that can be made; don't even hesitate to tell the world _that you will even concede what two years ago no Power would have asked of you_, rather than give another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up of your country[473]." Without doubt Bright's letters had great influence on Lincoln and on other Cabinet members, greatly aiding Seward, but that his task was difficult is shown by the fact that an entire morning's discussion brought no conclusion.