On November 30, also, the Government hurriedly sent out orders to hold the British Fleet in readiness, began preparations for the sending of troops to Canada, and initiated munitions and supply activities.

Evidently there was at first but faint hope that a break in relations, soon to be followed by war, was to be avoided[420].
It has long been known to history, and was known to Adams almost immediately, that the first draft of the instruction to Lyons was softened in language by the advice of Prince Albert, the material point being the expression of a hope that the action of Captain Wilkes was unauthorized[421].

That instruction had been sent previous to the receipt of a report from Lyons in which, very fearful of results, he stated that, waiting instructions, he would preserve a strict silence[422].

Equally anxious was Cowley at Paris, who feared the realization of Seward's former "foreign war panacea." "I wish I could divest myself of the idea that the North and South will not shake hands over a war with us[423]." Considering the bitterness of the quarrel in America this was a far-fetched notion.

The efforts promptly made by the Confederate agents in London to make use of the _Trent_ affair showed how little Cowley understood the American temper.