That it was but a briefly held thought has been shown by expressions from him already cited[393].

Nor was he alone in ministerial uncertainty[394], but Palmerston was not inclined to alter British policy.

October 18, he replied to Russell: "As to North America, our best and true policy seems to be to go on as we have begun, and to keep quite clear of the conflict between North and South....

The only excuse [for intervention] would be the danger to the intervening parties if the conflict went on; but in the American case this can not be pleaded by the Powers of Europe.
"I quite agree with you that the want of cotton would not justify such a proceeding, unless, indeed, the distress created by that want was far more serious than it is likely to be.

The probability is that some cotton will find its way to us from America, and that we shall get a greater supply than usual from other quarters.
"The only thing to do seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the Washingtonians to quarrel with us, while, on the other hand, we maintain our rights and those of our fellow countrymen[395]." In Washington the result of Mercier's conversation with Seward, outlining Thouvenel's suggestions, was a long and carefully prepared despatch to Dayton, in Paris, which the biographer of Seward thinks was one of his "great despatches; perhaps it was his greatest, if we consider his perfect balance and the diplomatic way in which he seemed to ignore what was menacing, while he adroitly let Thouvenel see what the result would be if the implied threats should be carried out[396]." Seward argued with skill the entire matter of cotton, but he was none the less firm in diplomatic defiance of foreign intervention.