He had previously expressed appreciation of Adams' conduct, writing to Lyons: "Mr.Adams has made a very favourable impression on my mind as a calm and judicious man[223]," and he now wrote: "I do not think Mr.Seward's colleagues will encourage him in a game of brag with England....

I am sorry Seward turns out so reckless and ruthless.

Adams seems a sensible man[224]." But at Washington Lyons was again hot on the trail of warlike rumours.

As a result of a series of conversations with Northern politicians, not Cabinet members, he sent a cipher telegram to Russell on June 6, stating: "No new event has occurred but sudden declaration of war by the United States against Great Britain appears to me by no means impossible, especially so long as Canada seems open to invasion[225]." This was followed two days later by a despatch dilating upon the probability of war, and ending with Lyons' opinion of how it should be conducted.

England should strike at once with the largest possible naval force and bring the war to an end before the United States could prepare.