Moreover, the exact facts of the Cabinet of May 21, and the complete reversal of Seward's policy were sufficiently known by May 24 to have reached the ears of Schleiden, who reported them in a letter to Bremen of that date[219].

And on the same day Seward himself told Schleiden that he did "not fear any longer that it would come to a break with England[220]." On May 27 Lyons himself, though still suspicious that an attempt was being made to separate France and England, was able to report a better tone from Seward[221].
British Ministers in London were not so alarmed as was Lyons, but they were disturbed, nevertheless, and long preserved a suspicion of the American Secretary of State.

May 23, Palmerston wrote to Russell in comment on Lyons' despatch of May 2: "These communications are very unpleasant.

It is not at all unlikely that either from foolish and uncalculating arrogance and self-sufficiency or from political calculation Mr.Seward may bring on a quarrel with us[222]." He believed that more troops ought to be sent to Canada, as a precautionary measure, but, he added, "the main Force for Defence must, of course, be local"-- a situation necessarily a cause for anxiety by British Ministers.

Russell was less perturbed.