On that date he wrote to Russell stating that people in Washington seemed so convinced that Europe would _not_ interfere to protect its trade that they were willing to venture any act embarrassing to that trade.

He himself was still insisting, but with dwindling confidence, that the trade must not be interfered with under any circumstances.

And in a second letter of this same date, he repeated to Russell his advice of treating the Southern Commissioners with deference.

Any rebuff to them, he asserts again, will but increase the Northern confidence that they may do anything without provoking the resistance of England[123].
Like a good diplomat Lyons was merely pushing the argument for all it was worth, hoping to prevent an injury to his country, yet if that injury did come (provided it were sanctioned by the law of nations) he did not see in it an injury sufficient to warrant precipitate action by Great Britain.

When indeed the Southern capture of Fort Sumter in Charleston harbour finally brought the actual clash of arms, Lyons expressed himself with regard to other elements in the struggle previously neglected in his correspondence.