Beyond that point there was no grasp of the complications likely to arise in case of war, and no clear formulation of British policy[72].
In fact up to the middle of March, 1861, both public and official British opinion discounted armed conflict, or at least any determined Northern effort to recover the South.

Early British attitude was, therefore, based on a misconception.

As this became clear, public opinion began to break from a united humanitarian pro-Northern sentiment and to show, in some quarters, quite another face.

Even as early as January the _Economist_ expressed wonder that the Northern States had not availed themselves gladly of the chance to "shake off such an incubus, and to purify themselves of such a stain[73]." and a month later professed to believe that Great Britain would willingly permit the North to secure compensation for loss of territory by annexing Canada--provided the Canadians themselves desired it.

This, it was argued, would directly benefit England herself by cutting down military expenditures[74].