Lyons urged that no such request be made as it was sure to be refused, interpreting the plan as intended to secure a British withdrawal of belligerent rights to the South, to be followed by a bold Northern defiance to France if she objected[1156].

Adams did discuss the project with Russell but easily agreed to postpone consideration of it and in this Seward quietly acquiesced[1157].

Apparently this was less a matured plan than a "feeler," put out to sound British attitude and to learn, if possible, whether the tie previously binding England and France in their joint policy toward America was still strong.

Certainly at this same time Seward was making it plain to Lyons that while opposed to current Congressional expressions of antagonism to Napoleon's Mexican policy, he was himself in favour, once the Civil War was ended, of helping the republican Juarez drive the French from Mexico[1158].
For nearly three years Russell, like nearly all Englishmen, had held a firm belief that the South could not be conquered and that ultimately the North must accept the bitter pill of Southern independence.

Now he began to doubt, yet still held to the theory that even if conquered the South would never yield peaceful obedience to the Federal Government.
As a reasoning and reasonable statesman he wished that the North could be made to see this.
"...