Public meetings were quickly organized in support of the Government's action, as that in Manchester on April 6, when six thousand people applauded the seizure of the _Alexandra_, demanded vigorous prosecution of the Lairds and others, and urged governmental activity to prevent any further ship-building for the South[1006].
On April 7, Russell wrote to Lyons: "The orders given to watch, and stop when evidence can be procured, vessels apparently intended for the Confederate service will, it is to be hoped, allay the strong feelings which have been raised in Northern America by the escape from justice of the _Oreto_ and _Alabama_[1007]." It thus appears that orders had been issued to stop, on _evidence_ to be sure, but on evidence of the vessels being "_apparently_ intended" for the South.

This was far from being the same thing as the previous assertion that conclusive evidence was required.

What, then, was the basic consideration in Russell's mind leading to such a face-about on declared policy?
Chagrin at the very evident failure of existing neutrality law to operate, recognition that there was just cause for the rising ill-will of the North, no doubt influenced him, but more powerful than these elements was the anxiety as to the real purpose and intent in application of the American "privateering" Bill.

How did Russell, and Lyons, interpret that Bill and what complications did they foresee and fear?
As previously stated in this chapter, the privateering Bill had been introduced as an "administration measure" and for that reason passed without serious debate.

In the Cabinet it was opposed by Welles, Secretary of the Navy, until he was overborne by the feeling that "something must be done" because vessels were building in England intended to destroy the blockade.