Russell had already commented to Adams that American privateers would find no Confederate merchant ships and that if they interfered with neutral commerce the United States Government would be put in an awkward position.

To this Adams replied that the privateers would seek and capture, if possible, vessels like the _Alabama_, but Russell asked Lyons to find out "whether in any case they [privateers] will be authorized to interfere with neutral commerce, and if in any case in what case, and to what extent[987]." Three days later, on March 26, Adams presented his instructions and these Russell regarded as "not unfriendly in tone," but in the long conversation that ensued the old result was reached that Adams declared Great Britain negligent in performance of neutral duty, while Russell professed eagerness to stop Southern shipbuilding if full evidence was "forthcoming." Adams concluded that "he had worked to the best of his power for peace, but it had become a most difficult task." Upon this Russell commented to Lyons, "Mr.Adams fully deserves the character of having always laboured for peace between our two Nations.

Nor I trust will his efforts, and those of the two Governments fail of success[988]." In these last days of March matters were in fact rapidly drawing to a head both in America and England.

At Washington, from March seventh to the thirty-first, the question of issuing letters of marque and reprisal had been prominently before the Cabinet and even Welles who had opposed them was affected by unfavourable reports received from Adams as to the intentions of Great Britain.

The final decision was to wait later news from England[989].