In the Senate, Grimes now clearly stated that the Bill was needed because the Confederates "are now building in England a fleet of vessels designed to break our blockade of their coast," and that the privateers were to "assist in maintaining blockades." There was no thorough debate but a few perfunctory objections were raised to placing so great a power in the hands of the President, while Sumner alone appears as a consistent opponent arguing that the issue of privateers would be dangerous to the North since it might lead to an unwarranted interference with neutral commerce.

No speaker outlined the exact method by which privateers were to be used in "maintaining blockades"; the bill was passed as an "administration measure." Coincidently, but as yet unknown in Washington, the chagrin of Russell at the escape of the _Alabama_ had somewhat lost its edge.

At first he had been impressed with the necessity of amending the Foreign Enlistment Act so as to prevent similar offences and had gained the approval of the law officers of the Crown.

Russell had even offered to take up with America an agreement by which both countries were to amend their neutrality laws at the same moment.

This was in December, 1862, but now on February 14, 1863, he wrote to Lyons that the project of amendment had been abandoned as the Cabinet saw no way of improving the law[981].
While this letter to Lyons was on its way to America, a letter from Seward was _en route_, explaining to Adams the meaning of the privateering bill.
"The Senate has prepared a Bill which confers upon the President of the United States the power to grant letters of marque and reprisal in any war in which the country may at any time be engaged, and it is expected that the Bill will become a law.