Their sympathies were of minor concern at the moment, nor were they much in evidence during the Cabinet crisis.

All argument was based upon the expediency and wisdom of the present proposal.

Could European nations _now_ act in such a way as to bring to an early end a war whose result in separation was inevitable?
It was the hope that such action promised good results which led Russell to enter upon his policy even though personally his sympathies were unquestionably with the North.

It was, in the end, the conviction that _now_ was not a favourable time which determined Palmerston, though sympathetic with the South, to withdraw his support when Russell, through pique, insisted on going on.

Moreover both statesmen were determined not to become involved in the war and as the possible consequences of even the "most friendly" offers were brought out in discussion it became clear that Great Britain's true policy was to await a return of sanity in the contestants[844].
For America Russell's mediation plan constitutes the most dangerous crisis in the war for the restoration of the Union.