Here, and here only, Great Britain voluntarily approached the danger of becoming involved in the American conflict[739].
Among the few who thought the withdrawal of Lindsay's motion, July 18, and the Prime Minister's comments did _not_ indicate safety for the North stood Adams, the American Minister.

Of Palmerston's speech he wrote the next day in his diary: "It was cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from it to show that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted by the favour of Divine Providence or our own efforts.
The anxiety attending my responsibility is only postponed[740]." At this very moment Adams was much disturbed by his failure to secure governmental seizure of a war vessel being built at Liverpool for the South--the famous _Alabama_--which was soon completed and put to sea but ten days later, July 29.

Russell's delay in enforcing British neutrality, as Adams saw it, in this matter, reinforcing the latter's fears of a change in policy, had led him to explain his alarm to Seward.
On August 16 Adams received an instruction, written August 2, outlining the exact steps to be taken in case the feared change in British policy should occur.

As printed in the diplomatic documents later presented to Congress this despatch is merely a very interesting if somewhat discursive essay on the inevitability of European ruminations on the possibility of interference to end the war and argues the unwisdom of such interference, especially for Great Britain's own interests.

It does not read as if Seward were alarmed or, indeed, as if he had given serious consideration to the supposed danger[741].