And suppose the North did acquiesce in an armistice the only peaceful solution would be an independent slave-holding South for the establishment of which Great Britain would have become intermediary and sponsor.

Any policy except that of the continuance of strict neutrality was full of dangers, some evident, some but dimly visible as yet.

Statesmanship required great caution; "...

looking to the probable consequences," Lewis concluded, "of this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether the chances of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good, and whether it is not-- 'Better to endure the ills we have Than fly to others which we know not of[791].'" At the exact time when Lewis thus voiced his objections, basing them on the lack of any sentiment toward peace in America, there were received at the Foreign Office and read with interest the reports of a British special agent sent out from Washington on a tour of the Western States.
Anderson's reports emphasized three points: (1) Emancipation was purely a war measure with no thought of ameliorating the condition of the slaves once freed; (2) Even if the war should stop there was no likelihood of securing cotton for a long time to come; (3) The Western States, even more then the Eastern, were in favour of vigorous prosecution of the war and the new call for men was being met with enthusiasm[792].
This was unpromising either for relief to a distressed England or for Northern acceptance of an armistice, yet Russell, commenting on Clarendon's letter to Palmerston, containing Derby's advice, still argued that even if declined a suggestion of armistice could do no harm and might open the way for a later move, but he agreed that recognition "would certainly be premature at present[793]." Russell himself now heard from Clarendon and learned that Derby "had been constantly urged to press for recognition and mediation but he had always refused on the ground that the neutral policy hitherto pursued by the Government was the right one and that if we departed from it we should only meet with an insolent rejection of our offer[794]." A long conference with Lyons gave cause for further thought and Russell committed himself to the extent that he acknowledged "we ought not to move _at present_ without Russia[795]...." Finally, October 22, Palmerston reached a decision for the immediate present, writing to Russell: "Your description of the state of things between the two parties is most comprehensive and just.

I am, however, much inclined to agree with Lewis that at present we could take no step nor make any communication of a distinct proposition with any advantage." * * * * * "All that we could possibly do without injury to our position would be to ask the two Parties not whether they would agree to an armistice but whether they might not turn their thoughts towards an arrangement between themselves.