In fact his description of the situation in December, 1861, as his own later pages show, was not applicable, so far as manufacturers' profits are concerned, until the later months of 1862 and the first of 1863.

For though prices might be put up, as they were, goods were not sold in any large quantities before the fall of 1862.

There were almost no transactions for shipments to America, China, or the Indies[677].
Foreign purchasers as always, and especially when their needs had just been abundantly supplied by the great output of 1858-60, were not keen to place new orders in a rising and uncertain market.

The English producers raised their prices, but they held their goods, lacking an effective market.

The importance of this in British foreign policy is that at no time, until the accumulated goods were disposed of, was there likely to be any trade eagerness for a British intervention in America.
Their only fear, says Arnold, was the sudden opening of Southern ports and a rush of raw cotton[678], a sneer called out by the alleged great losses incurred and patriotically borne in silence.