With respect to us it seems to be one of two deciding points." In another letter to the same person, then in Paris, dated April 9, he writes:-- "If France delays a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs, it will avail us nothing, should she attempt it hereafter....

Why need I run into detail, when it may be declared in a word that we are at the end of our tether, and that now or never our deliverance must come?
How easy would it be to retort the enemy's own game upon them, if it could be made to comport with the general plan of the war to keep a superior fleet always in these seas, and France would put us in condition to be active by advancing us money." Ships and money are the burden of his cry.

May 23, 1781, he writes to the Chevalier de la Luzerne: "I do not see how it is possible to give effectual support to the Southern States, and avert the evils which threaten, while we are inferior in naval force in these seas." As the season for active operations advances, his utterances are more frequent and urgent.

To Major General Greene, struggling with his difficulties in South Carolina, he writes, June 1, 1781: "Our affairs have been attentively considered in every point of view, and it was finally determined to make an attempt upon New York, in preference to a Southern operation, as we had not decided command of the water." To Jefferson, June 8: "Should I be supported in the manner I expect, by the neighboring States, the enemy will, I hope, be reduced to the necessity of recalling part of their force from the southward to support New York, or they will run the most imminent risk of being expelled from that post, which is to them invaluable; and should we, by a lucky coincidence of circumstances, gain a naval superiority, their ruin would be inevitable....

While we remain inferior at sea ...
policy dictates that relief should be attempted by diversion rather than by sending reinforcements immediately to the point in distress," that is, to the South.