In the opinion of a distinguished English naval officer of the day,[155] closely familiar with the ground, there was no doubt of the success of an attack; and he urged it frequently upon Rodney, offering himself to pilot the leading ship.

The security felt by the French in this position, and the acquiescence of the English in that security, mark clearly the difference in spirit between this war and the wars of Nelson and Napoleon.
It is not, however, merely as an isolated operation, but in relation to the universal war, that such an attempt is here considered.

England stood everywhere on the defensive, with inferior numbers.

From such a position there is no salvation except by action vigorous almost to desperation.

"It is impossible for us," wrote with great truth the First Lord of the Admiralty to Rodney, "to have a superior fleet in every part; and unless our commanders-in-chief will take the great line, as you do, and consider the king's whole dominions under their care, our enemies must find us unprepared somewhere, and carry their point against us."[156] Attacks which considered in themselves alone might be thought unjustifiable, were imposed upon English commanders.
The allied navy was the key of the situation, and its large detachments, as at Newport, should have been crushed at any risk.