As the _battle_ consisted merely in the passage by each other of two fleets, moving in opposite parallel directions, an encounter always indecisive and futile, the previous manoeuvres constitute the chief interest in an affair whose historical importance is due to other than tactical reasons.
[122] The line drawn through the centre of the English fleet at A shows the close-hauled line (south-southeast) on which, by strict tactical requirement, the English ships should have borne from each other.
[123] The leading ships of the two fleets diverged from each other (C), which is, by the French, attributed to the English van keeping away; by the English it is said that the French van luffed.

The latter account is followed in the diagrams.
[124] The position D, separated from the rest of the plan, shows the end of the passage by, which began at C.It could not be shown in connection with the other tracks without producing confusion.
[125] Afterward Duc d'Orleans; the Philippe Egalite of the French Revolution, and father of Louis Philippe.
[126] The capture of the French commander-in-chief on board his flag-ship, in the battle of April 12, 1782, was also a motive for this new order.
[127] The following incident, occurring during Rodney's chase of De Grasse, in April, 1782, shows how far subordination may be carried.
Hood was one of the finest of the British officers; nor does the author undertake to criticise his action.

He was some miles from Rodney at the time.

"The separated French ship in the N.W., having got the breeze at the same time as our van division, boldly stood for and endeavored to weather the British advanced ships; that being the only way to regain her own fleet, then to windward.

To such a length did she carry her audacity that she compelled the Alfred, the headmost ship of Sir Samuel Hood's division, to bear up in order to allow her to pass.