The government, always finding the expenses exacted by the employment of the navy excessive, too often prescribed to its admirals to keep the sea as long as possible without coming to pitched battles, or even to brushes, generally very expensive, and from which might follow the loss of ships difficult to replace.

Often they were enjoined, if driven to accept action, carefully to avoid compromising the fate of their squadron by too decisive encounters.

They thought themselves, therefore, obliged to retreat as soon as an engagement took too serious a turn.

Thus they acquired the unhappy habit of voluntarily yielding the field of battle as soon as an enemy, even inferior, boldly disputed it with them.

Thus to send a fleet to meet the enemy, only to retire shamefully from his presence; to receive action instead of offering it; to begin battles only to end them with the semblance of defeat; to ruin moral force in order to save physical force,--that was the spirit which, as has been very judiciously said by M.Charles Dupin, guided the French ministry of that epoch.